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Executive Summary 
Energy Efficient Scotland (EES) is a large scale energy efficiency improvement 
programme to be implemented in Scotland. Over a 20-year period, currently scheduled 
to start in 2020, an amount in excess of £10billion is planned to be directed to the 
improvement of the energy efficiency in domestic and non-domestic buildings. Funding 
for energy efficiency projects will come not only from the Scottish Government but also 
private interest-free and low interest loans as well as the successor(s) to the Energy 
Company Obligation (ECO). Aside from directing investment funds to the Scottish 
economy, promotion and support of energy efficiency through programmes such as 
EES, is one of the few instruments at the Scottish Government’s disposal to conduct 
energy policy, especially on the energy demand side.  
However, EES is considered to be more than an energy/climate change policy by the 
Scottish Government. For example, the stated goals of EES include the alleviation of 
fuel poverty among the lowest income Scottish households. On this basis, funding 
mechanisms such as government issued grants, are exclusively available to the lowest 
income households. More generally, energy efficiency has been identified as a 
‘national infrastructure priority’ in the EES Route Map document published in May 
2018, and the Scottish Energy Strategy published in December 2017 considers how 
energy efficiency actions may impact upon key economic indicators such as GDP and 
employment across the wider economy. 
EES was officially announced in May 2018 with the publication of the EES Route Map. 
At that time the UK was already in the process of leaving the European Union: 
commonly referred to as Brexit. Brexit, regardless of its final shape (which is currently 
unknown), is expected to affect policies in multiple ways including limitations to EU 
funds, skilled labour movement restrictions and increased import prices to name a few 
examples (among the potential impacts highlighted by different studies, reported in a 
2018 Institute for Government report1). The magnitude and the exact nature of any 
impacts will be affected by the exact form that Brexit will have. In this shifting socio-
economic landscape, EES will undoubtedly be affected in a range of ways. 
In the research presented in this working paper, in the first instance we focus attention 
on the funding limitations that Brexit could introduce to EES. Specifically, we identify 
two EES funding mechanisms that are likely to be affected; government-issued grants 
and privately-provided loans. For different reasons, these mechanisms are of 
paramount importance in order to achieve the EES goals as specified in the EES 
Route Map.  
First, Government grants are key to delivering the fuel poverty alleviation goal as it is 
a way for the government to contribute towards energy efficiency improvement 
projects for the lowest income households without those households being required to 
repay the costs of those improvements in the years to come. Restricted access to EU 
funds, regardless of whether they come from the European Investment Bank (EIB) or 
                                                     
1 The report by Tetlow and Stojanovic can be found here: 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/understanding-economic-impact-brexit 
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the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), could limit the Scottish 
Government’s ability to offer the originally planned amount of grants. 
Second, private loans, whether in interest-free or low-interest form, are in practice the 
main mechanism to fund EES projects, particularly for those households not eligible 
to receive grants. On this basis, the current plan is that private loans would constitute 
the largest source of contributions towards EES projects. However, uncertainty around 
Brexit and the future relationship between the UK and the EU has already begun to 
affect the availability of investment capital for loans, as highlighted by Froggat et al in 
a 2017 Chatham House report. Thus, it follows that reduced availability of loan finance 
could undermine the achievement of the energy/climate change goals as fewer 
households are likely to opt to implement energy efficiency improvement projects. 
These arguments provide the basis for our development of a range of scenarios that 
look at the differences in the outcomes of EES in the event that funding availability is 
in fact restricted. We compare the results of simulating these scenarios against a 
central ‘No-Brexit’ case. Our findings show that the impacts of Brexit need to be 
examined on a case by case basis. However, there are some general lessons from 
the research reported here: 
 Maintaining the originally-planned funding level is key. The level of funding 
determines the magnitude of the anticipated EES outcomes, especially the 
long-term ones that are driven by realising efficiency gains in energy use by 
Scottish households. For example, our ‘No-Brexit’ analysis for EES suggests 
that the lowest income households could ultimately achieve a 4.02% reduction 
in the energy required to run their homes. But a reduction of 10% in the amount 
offered as grants could reduce the extent of efficiency gains and energy 
savings to 3.74%, which may be further reduced to 1.21% if no grants are 
offered. 
 The options used to bridge any funding gaps need to be carefully 
considered. In particular, where a funding gap emerges in the provision of 
government grants, it is important to carefully design the mix of options used 
to raise the necessary funds and/or fill that gap. Otherwise, gains in the 
disposable income of the lowest income households could be eroded, from a 
potential 0.7% in the ‘No-Brexit’ case to 0.3% where no grants are provided. 
Moreover, it is likely to be at least 10 years after the beginning of EES before 
any positive effects can be observed, in contrast to the ‘No-Brexit’ case where 
positive effects are observed from the outset of EES. 
 The continued availability of private loans is crucial for the overall 
success of EES. Private loans are the dominant source of contributions 
towards EES projects. A 10% reduction in the availability of private loans will 
impact upon both employment gains and energy savings across the wider 
economy. Our ‘No-Brexit’ analysis suggests that EES could generate 
sustained employment gains of almost 5,000 new FTE jobs across the 
economy and 1.07% reduction in total energy use by 2050. But a 10% 
reduction in the availability of private loans limits the jobs gains to 
approximately 4,700 and erodes energy savings to 1%. Of course, the 
availability of funds or the cost of the loans is outside the direct control of the 
Scottish Government. Nonetheless, it is crucial to use any available 
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instruments to ensure that both the funding level and the cost of loans remains 
as close as possible to the originally-planned levels.   
The key ‘take home’ messages emerging are, first that the Scottish Government 
should aim to keep EES funding as close to the original level, and, second it needs to 
carefully consider how this may be done in the context of an uncertain Brexit. 
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1. Introduction 
The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) – commonly referred to as Brexit 
- has been a key point of discussion among various research communities and the 
general public since the 2016 referendum. Attempts to estimate the potential effects 
of Brexit are hampered by the many uncertainties that still surround Brexit outcomes. 
Almost 2 years after the Brexit referendum, the Scottish Government published the 
route map for its Energy Efficient Scotland (EES) programme. EES is a major energy 
efficiency improvement programme, with particular, but not exclusive, focus on 
households and residential energy use. It is planned to run for a 20 year period 
between 2020 and 2040 (although at present there is a process of consultation 
seeking wider views on a number of topics including whether the delivery of the 
programme needs to be accelerated). This means that if the UK leaves the EU at any 
point within the next few years, most of the project-related activity around EES would 
take place after Brexit. Yet, our previous work exploring the potential economy-wide 
impacts of EES (Turner et al., 2018), as is the case with the majority of the research 
evaluating the potential economy-wide impacts of energy efficiency policies, has 
assumed a static policy environment, with little consideration of whether the planned 
EU exit will alter that environment.  
Brexit will remove a layer of governance hitherto provided by the EU, leaving the policy 
environment less certain, at least in the short-term. At the same time the uncertainty 
regarding the final form of the future UK-EU relationship is already having a profound 
destabilising effect on the political and economic landscape. The changes in the nature 
of the future UK-EU relationship could contribute to significantly different outcomes 
generated by EES. It is crucial then to explore how the removal of a governance level 
and the associated uncertainty regarding the future UK-EU relationship, including how 
access to various EU policy funding mechanisms is affected, could influence the 
anticipated impacts of EES. 
In this working paper, we explore how Brexit may affect the goals of the Scottish 
Government’s energy efficiency improvement projects under EES, with a specific 
focus on how changes to funding availability impact upon the wider economy effects 
of the programme. The EES Route Map identifies three main funding streams. The 
first is government grants targeted at the least affluent households. The second is 
contributions through energy suppliers under the Energy Company Obligation (ECO) 
scheme or any of its potential successors. The third is interest-free or low interest 
loans, provided by private institutions or the Scottish Government. The broader 
economic uncertainties associated with the UK leaving the EU generate risks for the 
availability of private loans, and at the same time, the Scottish Government might find 
it difficult to offer grant funding once EU funding streams end. The only funding option 
that is likely to be relatively unaffected (at least directly) by Brexit is ECO. 
Reduced funding availability would be a crucial change in the economic environment 
for EES. As with any retrofitting/intervention project, the amount of funds that can be 
allocated for a certain purpose is a key determinant of the potential level of activity and 
anticipated impacts. In that sense, the Scottish Government may have to make some 
important decisions. Would it accept that funding is more restricted and therefore the 
goals of EES will need to be revisited to reflect the new circumstances? Or will it seek 
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to fill the potential funding gap through taxation, provision of additional government-
backed loans and/or other potential options? And how can we expect changes to the 
availability of funding to affect the outcomes of the EES programme? These are the 
questions we explore in this working paper. 
The working paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline current Scottish 
energy efficiency policies and set out their EU dimension, with a particular focus on 
EU funding and the availability of finance. We identify a number of pathways, including 
potentially restricted access to European funds and the challenges of securing 
alternative funding streams within Scotland. In Section 3 we describe the central ‘No-
Brexit’ case that is the base line against which we will compare our scenarios in this 
working paper.  
Section 4 presents the scenarios we model in relation to reduced provisions of grants 
by the Scottish Government. We explore scenarios in which availability is partially 
restricted and ones in which there are no grants available for a certain period of time. 
We also explore potential options that can be employed to cover the losses in grants. 
Our analysis shows that maintaining the funding level is key to achieve similar energy 
savings to the ones possible under the original EES planning. We also find that if 
interest-free loans are the only means to bridge the funding gap then there is the 
potential for negative impacts on the disposable income of the lowest income 
households.  
In Section 5 we shift our attention to privately issued loans and the impacts of restricted 
availability due to investors’ reluctance to provide the same amounts of capital. We 
find that this would erode not only the energy savings achieved across the Scottish 
economy but also the employment opportunities driven by EES activity and energy bill 
savings. In fact the impact from reduced employment opportunities affects the entire 
spectrum of Scottish households, albeit to varying degrees. 
Finally, in Section 6 we provide a summary of the key messages coming out of this 
work, the additional ways in which Brexit can affect EES, and suggest further research 
steps. 
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2. Scottish Energy Efficiency policies and Brexit 
The EU has made key contributions to improving energy efficiency in all member 
states since 2012 through the setting of targets to reduce energy demand and increase 
energy efficiency standards. The 2012 EU Energy Efficiency Directive set binding 
measures to help the EU reach its target of a 20% improvement in energy efficiency 
by 2020. These EU targets leave considerable discretion to national governments to 
formulate their policy approaches to help them achieve their share of the target.  
2.1 Current Scottish energy efficiency policies 
Within the UK, energy policy and the regulation of the gas and electricity markets are 
the responsibility of different governing bodies. Energy policy is almost wholly 
devolved in Northern Ireland, while the Northern Ireland Utility Regulator is responsible 
to regulate the energy sector. On the other hand in Great Britain, the regulation of the 
gas and electricity markets is reserved for a GB-wide authority, Ofgem, while energy 
policy is mainly conducted by the UK government.  
The devolved governments of Scotland and Wales have responsibility for promoting 
energy efficiency, including through supporting and funding projects intended to 
reduce energy demand and improve the energy efficiency of residential and 
commercial buildings. In Scotland, the devolved government has identified energy 
efficiency as a national infrastructure priority since 2015 (as highlighted in the EES 
route map), resulting in significant attention and funding directed at delivering more 
energy efficient buildings. The EES is the delivery programme intended to implement 
that priority, starting in 2020 and following the completion of a transition programme 
between the existing energy efficiency improvement measures and EES. 
As the International Energy Agency highlights (IEA, 2014), the objectives underpinning 
energy efficiency actions can span multiple policy fields; they do not need to be 
considered exclusively as energy and climate change policy tools. The Scottish 
Government seems to share this view. The main goals identified for EES are to remove 
energy inefficiency from the drivers of fuel poverty and to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions (alongside the decarbonisation of heat). It is evident, then, that EES 
has both social and environmental priorities in relation to climate change and fuel 
poverty. In order to achieve these goals, it is crucial that energy efficiency 
improvement measures can be accessed by the widest number of households 
possible; especially those households that are currently considered as fuel poor2. 
According to the 2017 Scottish House Condition Survey3, 613,000 Scottish households 
are estimated to be in fuel poverty, with 174,000 of them in extreme fuel poverty.  
                                                     
2 There are different definitions of which households are considered to be in fuel poverty. The DEFRA definition 
for England and Wales contained in the Energy Conservation Act 2000 states that “A fuel poor household is one 
which needs to spend more than 10% of its income on all fuel use and to heat its home to an adequate standard 
of warmth”.  A less strict version was introduced in 2014. The Scottish definition was contained in the Housing 
(Scotland) Act 2001, while there is a new definition in the Fuel Poverty (Target, Definition and Strategy) 
(Scotland) Bill stating “Households should be able to afford the heating and electricity needed for a decent quality 
of life. Once a household has paid for its housing, it is in fuel poverty if it needs more than 10% of its remaining 
income to pay for its energy needs, and if this then leaves the household in poverty”.  
3 The main outcomes of the survey can be found here: https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-house-
condition-survey-2017-key-findings/  
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Yet, a substantial upfront investment is necessary in order to install many efficiency 
improvement measures. This is something that fuel poor, and less affluent households 
in general, may find difficult. Accordingly, the EES includes provisions for government 
grants targeted specifically to those households that struggle to fund the 
improvements on their own or even to repay interest-free or low-interest loans that 
would enable them to do so. 
2.2 Funding and the changing EU context 
How will the government grants, and EES as a whole, be funded? The EES Route 
Map highlights a number of existing energy efficiency programmes that will support 
the delivery of EES. Box 1 highlights some of the key programmes that will be used. 
These programmes  range from low and interest-free loans, to direct contributions by 
the Scottish Government to Household Energy Efficiency Programmes for Scotland 
(HEEPS) schemes that include a multitude of grants and household contributions.  
For the loan schemes in Box 1 there is an expectation that the recipients will eventually 
repay the loan within a fixed time period that largely depends on the specific 
requirements of each scheme. For instance, the district heat loans are repayable 
between 10 to 15 years, whereas the SME loans have an 8-year repayment period. 
On the other hand, schemes like HEEPS provide grants as part of the overall support 
provided to households to improve the energy efficiency of their properties - household 
contributions may also be necessary.  
 
Box 1: Energy efficiency programmes to support the delivery of EES 
 Low Carbon Infrastructure Transition Programme (LCITP) provides 
financial support to low carbon energy generation projects for a range of 
technologies. £40 million of funding has been offered since March 2015 
to 16 low carbon demonstration projects and supported over 30 proof of 
concepts for proposals. 
 District Heating Loan Fund supports district heating schemes through 
low interest unsecured loans with 10 or 15 year repayment terms. £15 
million has been lent to over 50 projects in Scotland since 2011. 
 SME Loan Scheme offers businesses loans of up to £100,000 at low or 
no cost for efficiency measures and renewable technologies through 
Resource Efficient Scotland (RES). Over 800 projects have been 
financed through the scheme since 2008. 
 Home Energy Scotland (HES) Loan Scheme provides energy 
efficiency and renewable technology interest-free loans of up to £35,000 
through the Energy Saving Trust (EST). It was launched in 2017 and 
1,325 loans have been offered with a total value of £3.4 million. 
 Home Energy Efficiency Programmes for Scotland (HEEPS) 
includes four programmes: Area Based Schemes, Warmer Homes 
Scotland, Home Energy Scotland Loan Scheme, and Equity Loan Pilot 
Scheme.  
 Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) (GB-wide) provides payments for 
domestic and non-domestic heat generated from renewable energy and 
is promoted by the Scottish Government. The scheme’s uptake is 
relatively high in Scotland (pro-rata at 20% of total Great Britain 
accreditations). 
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The funds for HEEPS are provided by the Scottish Government, and part of the funding 
required for programmes like the LCITP comes from the European Union and 
specifically the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF). ESIF is a significant 
source of investment funds for Scotland and the UK as a whole, for low-carbon 
economy and climate adaptation programmes. A 2017 Chatham house report4 
highlighted that for the 2014-2020 period a total of €5.5billion was allocated to the UK 
for such programmes: €2.9billion for low-carbon economy and €2.6billion for climate 
adaptation. In Scotland, the total amount available through ESIF, in the same 2014-
2020 period, is €941million5 and is directed in a number of areas of policy interest 
including the transition to a low-carbon Scotland and tackling poverty. It is fair to say 
then that ESIF is a significant funding stream for Scottish policies and one that may 
be at risk following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.   
ESIF is not the only EU funding source that may be at risk following Brexit. The 
Chatham House report also highlighted that a total of £2.5billion per annum is 
allocated to the UK for energy investments by the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
Assuming a proportional distribution based on each devolved nation’s GDP, with 
Scottish GDP being approximately 10% of UK’s GDP, Scotland receives 
approximately £250million per annum for energy investments. Given that this is the 
total amount invested, it is not exclusively allocated on energy efficiency projects but 
covers a wide array of energy related investments.  
However, a 2018 European Union (EU) directive6 set targets regarding the ways in 
which greenhouse gas (GHG) emission savings will be achieved by 2030. It 
highlighted that EU aims to achieve 32.5% of its GHG emission savings through 
energy efficiency improvements. Assuming that this decision affects how the EIB funds 
are distributed, this equates to a total amount of £81.25m to be provided to Scotland 
for energy efficiency projects until 2030, i.e. just under £8m per year.  
We do not yet know what form Brexit will take. If the UK leaves with a deal, we can 
assume that EU funding sources will still be accessible to the UK during the transition 
period. A close UK-EU relationship thereafter could still permit access to some EU 
funds, but it is reasonable to assume that structural and investment funds designed to 
help the EU meet its strategic objectives will no longer be available to the UK. This 
risks generating a funding gap for EES. The Scottish Government would, of course, 
be free to finance energy efficiency projects from its own revenues and the UK 
Government may decide to replace the EU’s structural and investment funding with its 
own scheme. However, energy efficiency improvements compete alongside other 
significant policy items for a share of a finite pool of public funds and energy efficiency 
is not the only area that may face a funding gap as a result of EU exit. This could lead 
to funding being reduced, potentially shaping the projected outcomes of EES. 
                                                     
4 The report can be found here: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/staying-connected-key-elements-uk-
eu27-energy-cooperation-after-brexit  
5 According to the Scottish Government’s website: https://www.gov.scot/policies/european-structural-funds/ 
6 Energy Efficiency Directive – Directive 2018/2002/EU, OJ L 328/210, 21 December 2018. Can be found here: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/2002/oj 
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EES projects will not be exclusively funded through grants. The programmes to 
support the implementation of EES (see Box 1) include several low or interest-free 
loan options, while the Energy Company Obligation (ECO) is embedded in the funding 
of HEEPS. Among the different funding mechanisms for EES, ECO and its potential 
successor(s) seems to be the least likely to be affected by Brexit. It is possible that a 
future obligation scheme may spread the cost differently across the customer base of 
UK energy suppliers, but this is a change associated with domestic policymaking 
rather than the direct effects of Brexit. Similarly, for any government-backed interest-
free loans provided to the lowest income households, it is not unrealistic to assume 
that the Scottish Government will opt to keep the amount available at the originally 
planned levels, given that the receiving households are required to repay the loans. 
This way the government will ultimately recover the amount offered, albeit with 
reduced purchasing power. 
However, for the provision of non-government-backed loans, the Scottish Government 
relies on private investors to support the efficiency improvement projects of Scottish 
households. Brexit, as a whole, has introduced uncertainties regarding the future of 
the UK and Scottish economies. In this economic environment, investors may be 
reluctant to, or at least less interested and/or confident in, providing funding. The 2017 
Chatham House report argues that following the EU withdrawal referendum, the 
availability of investment capital was reduced by 10% compared to the period prior to 
the referendum (Froggatt et al, 2017, pp. 30). One of the main challenges of the 
Scottish Government will be to address any concerns on behalf of the investors and 
ensure that the funding availability is at the originally anticipated/desired levels. The 
extent to which the Scottish Government will be able to address investors’ concerns 
will largely determine the availability of private funding for households looking to 
participate in EES.   
Of course, the potential impacts of Brexit on EES are not limited to restrictions on the 
funding availability for retrofitting projects. There are also likely impacts associated 
with new limitations in recruiting skilled labour from the EU, and/or the possible tariffs 
on EU goods and services in the UK and vice versa. However, these impacts are 
outwith the scope of this working paper. Here we focus only on the funding limitations 
and how these, and the potential options to overcome them, may affect the anticipated 
outcomes of EES. We disuss how the estimated labour and price impacts could be 
explored in future research in the final section of this working paper. 
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3. The central ‘No-Brexit’ case 
The work that we discuss in this working paper builds on and updates previous work 
we have conducted on the potential economy-wide impacts of the residential energy 
efficiency gains more generally, and of the Energy Efficiency Scotland (EES) 
programme in the Scottish Economy particular. For the latter see the (Turner et al., 
2018) policy briefing that was published on the day of the publication of the EES route 
map in May 2018. In this working paper, we update that analysis with a Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model based on more recent data (calibrated on a Scottish 
social accounting matrix, SAM, for 2013). This model includes all the sectors in the 
Scottish economy and actors such as the wider government, households etc. It allows 
us to study how a change, for example the improvement of household energy 
efficiency, drives a number of economy-wide impacts in areas such as GDP and 
employment. To keep the main body of this working paper accessible to a wider 
audience we include the description of the model used in Appendix A. Our 
consideration of how energy efficiency programmes in the residential sector may 
impact across the wider economy, in particular set in the context of the case for public 
support, builds on an existing body of work conducted at the University of Strathclyde 
and in the wider energy economics literature.  
There is an issue in that much of the research on the economic impacts of energy 
efficiency improvements has been concentrated on energy rebound effects (i.e. with 
a focus on how economic responses may lead to an erosion of technically possible 
energy saving and after that a wider range of, for example, employment and GDP 
impacts). On the other hand, consideration of economy-wide rebound is instructive as 
it indicates the size of positive income effects emerging as a result of efficiency gains. 
This literature is reviewed in Turner (2013). The applied economy-wide modelling 
approach adopted here with application for the Scottish and UK economies has been 
developed through a range of papers, initially with focus on industrial energy efficiency 
(e.g. see Allan et al., 2007; Hanley et al., 2009) and more recently, with attention to 
residential energy use (see Lecca et al., 2014; Figus et al., 2017, 2018).  
3.1 What are the main results of the central ‘No-Brexit’ case? 
EES will be funded using a mixture of funding sources and support programmes. The 
EES Route Map identifies a number of loan schemes, grants and other programmes 
that use a range of funding streams to support energy efficiency improvement 
measures, and which will have a role in the implementation of EES from 2020 
onwards. However, the exact mixture is currently unknown. For our central case, we 
assume that the entire EES will be implemented using a funding model similar to the 
one used in the nationally-managed Warmer Homes Scotland programme, which is 
part of Home Energy Efficiency Programmes for Scotland (HEEPS). HEEPS is one of 
the programmes currently in place that are being used by the Scottish Government to 
promote energy efficiency improvements, and is exclusively focused on domestic 
buildings. HEEPS is also part of the transition phase until the implementation of EES 
formally begins in 2020 and is also, as shown in Box 1, part of the set of programmes 
that are expected to be used to implement EES.  
Energy efficiency improvements supported via Warmer Homes Scotland use a number 
of funding mechanisms: government grants, ECO contributions, contributions by 
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households themselves, and finally contributions in kind from Scottish Gas Networks 
in the form of reduced or no-cost connections to the gas network. The latter accounts 
for an equivalent value of approximately 20% of the total funds available, but for the 
purposes of our work it has been excluded from consideration. This is due to the 
absence of data that we could use to model contributions in kind. Thus, for our central 
case we focus on £8billion of funding for EES projects, rather than the total £10billion 
suggested in the EES Route Map. We assume that the total funds available from all 
sources will be made available and utilised evenly across the 20-year time frame, 
enabling equal average increments to the energy efficiency of Scottish households in 
each year, but with the lowest income quintile making greater gains due to the 
enhanced funding targeted at and available to them. The breakdown of funding 
available for EES in our central case is summarised in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Summary of EES funding provided in central 'No-Brexit' case  
    
 
Lowest income 
households (1st 
quintile) - per year 
All other 
households -per 
year 
Total (across all 
households and 
20-year EES 
programme) 
Government grants £78m per year  
No government 
grants 
£1,560m 
ECO contributions £13.99m per year £46.01m per year £1,200m 
Government -
backed loans 
£18.22m per year 
No government-
backed loans 
£364.41m 
Private loans No private loans £243.78 per year £4,875.59m 
        
Total funding 
available 
£110.21m per year £289.79m per year £8,000m 
Energy efficiency 
improvement 
(incremental per 
year) 
0.66% per year 0.43% per year 
 
Total Energy 
Efficiency 
improvement 
13.20% 8.67% 
 
 
The information in Table 1 reflects the funding accessibility limitations imposed by the 
EES Route Map. For example, government grants are available only to the lowest 
income households. We assume that interest-free loans enable households to 
contribute their share of the costs of retrofitting their properties. These take the form 
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of government-backed loans in the case of the lowest income quintile, with all other 
groups relying on funding via private institutions. Thus, ECO is the only funding 
mechanism open to every household regardless of income, but which must be repaid 
through the energy bills of all consumers. 
So how does EES impact the wider economy? It does so via two triggers and two 
routes, which we refer to as ‘enabling’ and ‘realising’ stages. In the first instance the 
funding availability affects the magnitude of the retrofitting activity. This is what we 
refer to as the ‘enabling’ stage of an energy efficiency programme, i.e. the period 
during which the retrofitting activity takes place. We assume that it takes the form of 
spending in the Scottish ‘Construction’ sector. Regardless of whether any efficiency 
gains are actually realised, activity throughout the enabling stage will impact the wider 
economy via what is a significant mid-range boost to activity in Scottish Construction 
and other Scottish industries via supply chain ‘multiplier effects’. 
We estimate that the enabling stage of the residential energy efficiency element of 
EES has the potential to deliver a cumulative (undiscounted) boost of £2.5billion to 
Scottish GDP over the next 30 years (in 2013 prices that relate to our model’s 
database). Of course, this enabling stage, just like any economic expansion occurring 
in the presence of even short term constraints (in the availability of labour and capital), 
will cause price pressures and have some short term ‘crowding out’ effects (we 
assume that labour and capital constraints relax over time due to migration of workers 
and investment in capital). Nonetheless, our results suggest that the peak of a period 
of increased employment associated with the enabling state is reached with a net gain 
of 4,246 additional jobs in the sixth year of the twenty-year programme. 
The point that there is a peak is an important one to note. Following this, despite still 
having fourteen years to run, the wider economic boost from the enabling stage alone 
loses power. This is partly because an increasing number of Scottish households are 
paying back the loans that finance their contributions and also paying indirectly for the 
ECO contribution through their energy bills. This in turn limits the ‘multiplier’ effect of 
increased wage income and the household spending that it supports.  
However, the main reason the economic boost wanes after a peak is that the enabling 
stage does not really outlive the projects. Indeed, as the 20-year period of spending 
on retrofitting draws to a close, producers will begin to make other plans for their 
equipment and workers, with the process of reallocation potentially triggering a gross 
contraction in economic activity for a few years at the end of the enabling stage.  
But, these negative impacts are offset by gains from the simultaneous positive impacts 
of actually realising energy efficiency gains. This is the second, and ultimately more 
important, trigger for wider economic expansion generated by an energy efficiency 
programme like EES. The lasting legacy of the enabling stage is that it enables the 
‘realising’ stage, by facilitating energy efficiency gains. It is the efficiency gains in 
energy use that permit households to access the same energy services (e.g. heating 
homes to the same temperature for a given period of time) at reduced cost. This will 
in turn reduce energy bills and, thus, increase disposable income for recipient 
households to spend on other things.  
It is the impact of this increased spending power, and the shift and boosted nature of 
spending that enables sustained expansion across the economy. In any one time 
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period during the adjustment process even households that have not benefitted from 
energy efficiency gains will realise real income gains through boosted wage incomes 
and, for higher income households, returns to investment/ownership of capital as the 
economy expands. Moreover, given that the efficiency improvement enables a lasting 
change in how households use energy, the trigger effect on household incomes and 
spending power through reduced energy bills is a lasting one. 
One key point to note, in considering how wider expansionary effects further impact 
upon the real incomes of Scottish households, is that the group of most concern to 
policymakers (low income households) gain less via this route. This is because 
employment and ownership of capital do not constitute a major part of the incomes of 
the lowest income households. Thus (as investigated in some detail by Figus et al., 
2017), the direct impacts of the energy efficiency gains on bills and spending power 
are a much more important source of gain for the lowest income quintile on which we 
focus our attention here. 
In terms of the combined results for our central ‘No-Brexit’ case, the funding set out in 
Table 1 ultimately enables a 23.66% energy efficiency improvement per retrofitted 
property, which is the average estimated improvement from Warmer Homes Scotland 
projects7. However, as the funds are not sufficient to retrofit every household in each 
income quintile, the overall efficiency of each quintile improves proportionately by less 
than this. This is the annual incremental efficiency improvement reported in Table 1. 
The funds available for the lowest income quintile are sufficient to improve the 
quintile’s energy efficiency by 13.2% at the end of the 20-year programme. In the same 
timeframe, those available to the remaining four quintiles are sufficient to make each 
one 8.67% more energy efficient. The difference in efficiency gains between the lowest 
income quintile and the remaining four quintiles is directly linked to the extent of funds 
available in each. The lowest income quintile has approximately £110million per year 
available for retrofitting projects. The remaining quintiles have to share around 
£290million each year, i.e. £72.5million per quintile per year (assuming an even 
distribution of the funds across the quintiles). 
For our central case we combined all the funding mechanisms available to the different 
quintiles and the efficiency gains supported by the funding available to each 
household. We obtained the following headline results regarding the potential impact 
of the residential energy efficiency element of EES on the Scottish Economy. 
 A cumulative GDP gain of £5.6billion by the end of the programme in 2040 and 
£7.5billion in the 30-years following the beginning of the main phase of EES 
(i.e. by 2050) 
 A sustained GDP expansion of 0.2% compared to pre-EES 
 Approximately 6,300 net additional full-time (FTE) jobs by the end of the 
programme in 2040 and just under 5,000 net sustained FTE jobs by 2050, with 
the ‘realising’ rather than the ‘enabling’ stage being key to these gains over the 
longer term  
                                                     
7 The estimates are based on the EPC certificates of properties before and after retrofitting them using Warmer 
Homes Scotland funding. 
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Moreover, and associated with the focus of this working paper, we found that under 
the central ‘No-Brexit’ case, by 2050: 
 The lowest income households enjoy an average 0.73% increase in their 
disposable income. Crucially their disposable income is higher compared to 
the pre-EES levels across the entire duration of the programme 
 The lowest income households achieve a 4.02% reduction in the energy 
required to run their homes (referred to here as residential energy use). Across 
the economy total energy use drops by 1.07% (including industrial energy use) 
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4. The potential impacts of restrictions in the provision of 
government grants 
Our central case results reflect what the potential EES impacts to the Scottish 
economy could be if Brexit left the socio-economic landscape somewhat unaffected 
(and EES is deployed as set out). But, a large political development like Brexit should 
be expected to affect the potential impacts of any policy in multiple ways, so the focus 
of this study is revisiting our central case scenario to begin consideration of this. 
In this section we focus on how the potential impacts of EES could be affected if the 
Scottish Government is no longer able to offer the originally planned amount of grants 
due to Brexit. Grants are a significant part of the total funding of EES and the fact that 
they are exclusively available to the lowest income households renders grants a key 
tool in achieving the social goals of EES, namely the alleviation of fuel poverty. The 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU could lead to restricted access to EU funds and EIB 
loans8, specifically for energy efficiency projects and/or more general policies that up 
until now were supported by the EU. One potential outcome then could be that the 
Scottish Government will have a smaller pool of funds available to offer as grants to 
the lowest income households. 
However, in evidence submitted by the E3G climate change think tank to the House 
of Lords EU Financial Affairs sub-committee’s enquiry ‘Brexit: the European 
Investment Bank’9, it is assumed that the negative impact on capital funding should be 
temporary. Post-Brexit, the UK could reach an equivalent level of funding for energy-
related projects (including energy efficiency improvement) 10 years after the 
withdrawal from the EU10. In the interest of simplicity we assume that the UK will leave 
the EU in 2020, the same year that the main body of EES begins. In this case there 
will be funding restrictions until 2030 (year 10), before the UK manages to raise the 
equivalent level of lost EU funds and therefore the Scottish Government is once again 
able to offer the originally planned annual amount of grants for EES projects. 
Based on the information we presented so far, we developed a number of scenarios, 
which we have organised in two sets based on the size of the restrictions that we 
anticipate on the availability of funds for grants. The first set focusses on the scenarios 
where there is a partial restriction in the funding available for grants, while the second 
set explores scenarios where there is no funding available for grants. In each set, we 
explore what the impacts would be if the Scottish Government opts or not to restore 
the funding levels to the ones originally planned and how the method used to restore 
the funding level could influence the anticipated outcomes. 
 
                                                     
8 Although these funds are not directly allocated to the Scottish Government (SG), it is likely that SG may have to 
provide support to projects that rely on EIB loans 
9 See the 25th Report of Session 2017-19, HL Paper 269 available here: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/269/269.pdf   
10 Please note that the evidence focus on lending levels matching those provided by EIB. However, in the 
absence of any other useful information we generalise this assumption to cover the entire funds, not only the 
ones provided by EIB loans. 
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4.1 Scenarios Set 1: Restricted provision of government grants 
Based on the previous analysis we assume that there will be a reduction of £8million 
per year in the amount of funds available for government grants, i.e. approximately 
10% of the annual amount, which will last until year 10 of our simulations and then 
recover to the original levels. We have then developed the following scenarios: 
A. The government decides not to raise funds in any other way so there are 
fewer government grants offered until year 10. This means that for the first 10 
years of EES the amount available for government grants is reduced to £70million 
per year. 
B. The government decides to match the original level of funding available to 
low income households by offering more via government-backed loans. In 
this case, until year 10, the amount available for grants is £70million per year but 
the amount available through loans increases by £8million per year. There are 
implications then due to the increased repayment requirements. 
C. The government foresees the upcoming reduction in European funds and 
decides to raise half of the necessary funds by other means. Here we consider 
that this may be through budget neutral options (i.e. making use of whatever 
external funds are available), with the other half through income tax. Starting from 
the point of year 11 (2031) after Brexit and until the end of EES’ ‘enabling’ stage 
the government still raises funds for grants through the income tax. The total 
amount available for grants remains at the original levels, £78million per year, 
across the entire duration of the programme, but this time the outcomes are 
affected by the fluctuations of income tax. A key point to highlight here is that 
income tax does not remain permanently high. Instead, we assume an endogenous 
income tax adjustment, which means that as soon as there are budget savings, as 
a result of EES, the government lowers the income tax to return the savings back 
to the households. 
The scenarios of Set 1 are summarised and compared against the central case in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2: Summary table of Scenarios Set 1 assumptions against central case (No-Brexit) 
     
 
Central case  
(No-Brexit) 
Scenario 1.A Scenario 1.B Scenario 1.C 
Government grants 
available (Until 
Year 10) 
£78m/year in 
government grants  
£70m/year in 
government grants  
£70m/year in 
government grants 
£39m/year in government 
grants raised through 
income tax increase; 
£39m/year in government 
grants raised from external 
funding 
Government grants 
available (Year 11 
until Year 20) 
£78m/year in 
government grants 
£78m/year in 
government grants 
£78m/year in 
government grants 
£78m/year in government 
grants raised through 
income tax increase 
ECO contributions 
available (Year 1 
until Year 20) 
£13.99/year in ECO 
contributions 
£13.99/year in ECO 
contributions 
£13.99/year in ECO 
contributions 
£13.99/year in ECO 
contributions 
Interest-free loans 
available (Until 
Year 10) 
£18.22/year in 
interest-free loans 
£18.22/year in 
interest-free loans 
£26.22/year in interest-
free loans 
£18.22/year in interest-
free loans 
Interest-free loans 
available (Year 11 
until Year 20) 
£18.22/year in interest-
free loans 
Assumption on 
income tax 
Exogenous Exogenous Exogenous Endogenous 
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Given that in Scenarios Set 1 our focus is on the government grants provided to the 
lowest income households, it is reasonable to also focus on the social side of EES and 
how it is affected by Brexit. In our model, the lowest income households are 
represented by the lowest income quintile. Some key characteristics of these 
households are that they are usually in fuel poverty11, hence the main target of the 
social aspect of EES, but also they often extract little income from the economy, i.e. 
from additional employment opportunities, capital gains etc. The latter implies that as 
the economy grows those households benefit less compared to other household 
groups and similarly when the economy contracts the suffer less.  
Based on those observations we believe that the key performance indicators (KPIs) 
regarding the effectiveness of the social side of EES are (a) the disposable income of 
the lowest income households and (b) their residential energy use, i.e. the energy 
required to run their dwellings. These are two key factors impacting fuel poverty so 
delivering beneficial changes to those variables can be associated with alleviation of 
fuel poverty. Therefore, we focus our attention on these, but identify the GDP and 
employment impacts at the start of each set to provide a wider economy context, 
particularly where employment impacts may impact real income levels. 
In this first Scenarios Set 1, our analysis shows that if the EES funding is reduced 
compared to the central case, as is the case in scenario 1.A, the cumulative GDP 
gains are eroded. Indeed, instead of £5.6billion cumulative GDP gains by 2040 (i.e. 
by the end of EES), in 1.A we observe cumulative GDP gains of around £5.5billion, 
i.e. an erosion of approximately £100million. Furthermore, because the economy 
expands by less, compared to the central case, we observe 60 less full-time equivalent 
(FTE) new jobs by 2040.  
In 1.B, the fact that EES funding level is kept at the originally planned level helps 
maintain more of the cumulative GDP gains. However, due to the increased loan 
repayments there is still an erosion of the 2040 cumulative GDP gains of 
approximately £50million. On the other hand, because the lowest income quintile 
becomes as energy efficient as it would be in the central case, the number of extra 
full-time jobs by 2040 is almost identical in the central case and scenario 1.B.   
Where we observe the most notably different results is scenario 1.C, where we 
assume an endogenous tax (i.e. the income tax rate is adjusted to ensure a balanced 
budget). Here, while initially bridging the funding gap through increased income tax, 
the government ultimately returns to the households any budget savings it achieves, 
through reductions of the income tax rate. By the end of EES in 2040, the budget 
savings due to the increased efficiency and retrofitting activity are sufficient to 
completely offset any negative effects in the early stages of EES, when income tax 
had to be increase to raise the funds for grants. As a result the 2040 cumulative GDP 
gains are around £6billion, over £400million above the central ‘No-Brexit’ case. 
                                                     
11 According to the 2017 Scottish House Condition Survey (SHCS), 88% of the households with weekly income, 
before housing costs, under £200 and 51% of the households with weekly income between £200 and £300 are in 
fuel poverty. Our lowest income quintile consists of households from these two income groups. The key findings 
of the 2017 SHCS can be found here: https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-house-condition-survey-2017-
key-findings/  
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Furthermore, in the same year there are over 400 more full-time jobs are created 
relative to the central case scenario. 
Differences in residential energy use 
Our central focus is how the changes in residential energy use and disposable income 
are affected by the Scenarios in Set 1 and how they compare to the central ‘No-Brexit’ 
case. Impacts on energy use in the lowest household income quintile in different years 
and across the four scenarios are presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Given that the aim of EES is to improve the energy efficiency of households, it is 
encouraging that the residential energy use of the lowest income households drops in 
every scenario of Set 1 and in the central case. However, there are some small 
differences that can be observed. The outcomes of the ‘realising’ stage of EES depend 
primarily on the level of efficiency improvement achieved, which in turn is affected by 
the funding availability for efficiency improvement projects. As a result, in scenarios 
1.B and 1.C the overall funding level is kept fixed, the lowest income quintile becomes 
13.2% more energy efficiency, which is the same energy efficiency gains observed in 
the central case. On the other hand in scenario 1.A, the reduced funding availability 
means that the lowest income quintile becomes 12.24% more energy efficient.  
The differences in energy efficiency gains under the different scenarios are the initial 
and core drivers underpinning the outcome of different residential energy use savings. 
Because the efficiency gains are identical in the central case and scenarios 1.B and 
1.C, we see that by the end of EES in 2040 the lowest income households achieve 
the same residential energy savings of around 4.38%. Furthermore, as shown in 
Figure 1, because in scenario 1.A the lowest income quintile becomes less energy 
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Figure 1: Potential EES-driven changes in residential energy 
use of the lowest income households for different scenarios 
regarding availability of government grants (Scenarios Set 1)
No-Brexit 1.A 1.B 1.C
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efficient, its residential energy savings in 2040 are eroded to 4.11%. It is useful to 
highlight that the relationship between the efficiency gains and the residential energy 
savings is not linear. In scenario 1.A a 7% drop in efficiency gains leads to a 6% 
erosion of the residential energy savings. The 2040 residential energy savings though 
are the largest achieved by EES. As can be seen in Figure 1, following the end of the 
‘enabling’ stage of EES, the residential energy savings are eroded in every scenario 
and the central case, indicating the presence of a ‘rebound effect’ driven by income 
effects associated with the ‘realising’ stage of EES. 
Differences in disposable income 
So what disposable income impacts are associated with these patterns of variation in 
efficiency gains and energy savings? Figure 2 compares the different scenarios of 
Scenarios Set 1 to the central ‘No-Brexit’ case. 
 
 
 
An immediate observation from Figure 2 is that under every scenario in Set 1, the 
lowest income households are better-off in terms of disposable income compared to 
their pre-EES status, as is the case with the central case. Indeed, even in what turned 
out to be the worst case scenario (1.A) the lowest income households observe a 0.47% 
increase in their disposable income in year 20, which continues to grow even 10 years 
after the end of EES. That the income gain is smallest under scenario 1.A, is driven 
by the smaller energy efficiency gains achieved. As households are becoming more 
energy efficient they need to spend a smaller portion of their income on energy to run 
their dwellings. With smaller energy bills, these households can now acquire more 
goods and services with the same income, i.e. they have a higher purchasing power. 
Simultaneously, there are some income increases associated with the increased 
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Figure 2: Potential EES-driven changes in the disposable 
income of the lowest income households for different 
scenarios regarding availability of government grants 
(Scenarios Set 1)
No-Brexit 1.A 1.B 1.C
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employment opportunities created by EES. But this is a limited source of income gain 
for the lowest income households due to the fact they tend to mainly rely on transfers 
from the government rather than labour income. 
From a social policy perspective, the increased disposable income is a desirable 
outcome, which, combined with the results presented in Figure 1, indicates that fuel 
poverty is alleviated, at least under the DEFRA definition of energy efficiency, even 
where Brexit impacts the funding for EES. However, in considering Figure 2 we can 
see that the disposable income impacts vary across scenarios. For example, under 
Scenario 1.A by year 30 the disposable income of the lowest income households 
increases by less compared to the central case (0.69% against 0.73% in central case). 
This is due to the fact that reduced funding leads to reduced realised energy efficiency 
and as a result fewer income benefits for the households. The fact that the funding 
gap is not covered in 1.A explains why the gap in potential income gains between the 
central case and 1.A never recovers. 
On the other hand, Scenarios 1.B and 1.C introduce some rather interesting outcomes 
under different timeframes. For the first 10 years of the ‘enabling’ stage the income 
gains for the lowest income households are even lower than those in Scenario 1.A 
where the funding is not covered. The driver behind this result is the higher payment 
requirements that have to be made by households. In 1.B they face larger annual loan 
repayments, which precede the fulfilment of any other need, while in 1.C households 
have to pay higher income taxes12 to raise part of the funds required for government 
grants. The difference between 1.B and 1.C in year 10 reflects the fact that using the 
tax system to raise funds has least impact on the incomes of the lowest income 
households. 
Generally, bridging the funding gap is particularly important for achieving the long-term 
policy goals of EES. When funding is kept at the originally planned levels, we can see 
that by the end of the ‘enabling’ stage (year 20) and thereafter, the household incomes 
match the central case results. This indicates that achieving the originally anticipated 
efficiency level, which is linked to the total amount available for EES projects, is 
sufficient to completely offset any losses in potential income gains observed in the first 
half of EES. In fact, if the gap is bridged using an endogenous tax process then by the 
end of the ‘enabling’ stage there are sufficient budget savings to allow a reduction of 
the income tax compared to the pre-EES level. The households then achieve not only 
savings in terms of their residential energy spending, but are also paying less income 
tax. This is the reason why 1.C delivers better long-term disposable income results 
compared to every other scenario in set 1 and the central ‘No-Brexit’ case. The energy 
savings though are eroded compared to the central case and by 2050, 1.C delivers a 
4% reduction of residential energy use instead of the 4.02% reduction achieved in the 
central case.  
It is important to set different gains in context. For example, because of the greater 
disposable income gain in 1.C we see smaller savings in residential, and total, energy 
use. That is, there is more rebound, but is rebound a ‘bad’ thing for low income 
households? Figure 1 shows that long-term residential energy use falls by less in 
                                                     
12 In our model, all the households have to pay income tax. As a result, all the households are affected when the 
tax is increased or decreased. However, the income tax is progressive meaning that the lowest income 
households need to pay less income tax whereas the more affluent one have to pay more. 
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scenario 1.C compared to the central case, despite the fact in both cases the same 
number of households has received an energy efficiency improvement. This outcome 
is driven by the greater disposable income gains that scenario 1.C delivers. Due to the 
increased disposable income available, the households of the lowest income quintile 
can meet their energy needs in a better way, meaning they can use more energy to 
run their properties. This shows the rebound enables the necessary ‘comfort taking’ 
for the low income households.  
The positive impacts of scenario 1.C are not only observed in the case of the lowest 
income households. The long-term reduction in income tax benefits all the households, 
just as all the households are contributing through their taxation to raise the funds for 
EES grants. The outcome of the long-term reduction in the income tax is income being 
freed-up for all the households to spend on goods and services. Hence, the larger 
cumulative GDP boost by 2040 in scenario 1.C compared to the central case, and the 
associated difference in full-time jobs. In fact, the gap between scenario 1.C and the 
central case grows in the years following the end of EES. The cumulative GDP gains 
in scenario 1.C grow to £8.5billion by 2050, compared to £7.5billion in the central case, 
while there are over 1,250 more full-time jobs. However, this GDP expansion comes 
at the expense of additional economy-wide energy needs, meaning that the total 
energy savings of 1.07% in the central case are eroded to 1% in scenario 1.C. 
4.2 Scenarios Set 2: Exploring major impacts on the government grants 
availability 
Scenarios Set 1 assumes that in the 2020-2030 period Scotland will have some 
access to European funds. However, the final nature of Brexit is yet to be determined 
and as a result this key assumption of Scenarios Set 1 might vary significantly, 
especially in the event of a ‘no deal’ Brexit. In an extreme case, Scotland could lose 
access to EIB funds and/or other European funds. This would put the entire funding 
availability for government grants at risk, at least until 2030 (year 10 of EES) when we 
assume that UK funding would be matched through alternative sources. This risk, and 
some of the options that could be used to deal with it, is the focus of our following 
scenarios: 
A. The government does not offer any grants. In this case the entire amount of 
£78m per year that was proposed to be offered as grants is lost. 
B. The government opts to maintain the EES funding levels through the use of 
interest-free loans. This means that there are no grants offered and instead the 
amount available as government-backed interest-free loans is increased by £78 
million per year. This way the amount of EES funding remains in line with what was 
initially proposed but there are significantly larger instalments to be paid by 
households during the first 10-years of the project. 
C. The government raises funds for grants through income tax until year 10. 
This is a similar scenario to 1.C described above, but requires that the government 
uses taxation exclusively to raise funds for grants for the first 10 years of the 
programme. After that point the grants are provided through the use of alternative 
funding sources. Similarly to 1.C the increase of income tax is not permanent and 
once there are budget savings the government reverses the income tax increase, 
returning the savings back to the households. 
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The scenarios of Set 2 are summarised in comparison with the central ‘No-Brexit’ case 
in Table 3. 
The results of Scenarios Set 1 show that a relatively small reduction in the annual 
availability of government grants is sufficient to limit but not completely offset the gains 
that can be expected by EES. But, if there are no grants available, at least temporarily, 
the effect on the KPIs could be sufficiently large to jeopardise the entire social side of 
EES. Furthermore, if the Scottish Government opts to bridge the funding gap then it is 
key to decide the optimal way to do it as Scenarios Set 1 indicates that the approach 
used affects the anticipated outcomes. Figure 3 presents the differences in residential 
energy use changes under each of the scenarios in Set 2 and the central case.  
An important observation from Scenarios Set 1 is that when the funding gap is not 
bridged, the largest erosion in cumulative GDP gains is observed. This outcome is 
magnified in scenario 2.A where the absence of grants for 10 years leads to 
approximately £800million less cumulative GDP gains by 2040, or £4.8billion in 2.A 
against £5.6billion in the central case. Furthermore, 635 fewer full-time jobs are 
created, and the reduced funding for energy efficiency projects enables the lowest 
income quintile to become only 3.86% more energy efficient instead of 13.2% in the 
central case. 
As we showed with scenario 1.B, bridging the funding gap helps mitigate the losses in 
cumulative GDP gains and jobs creation. As a result, in scenario 2.B we see that the 
erosion of cumulative GDP gains by 2040 is in the region of £500million, or £5.1billion 
in 2.B instead of £5.6billion in the central case. The loss in potential new jobs is 
dramatically reduced, with only 23 less full-time jobs created. Moreover, bridging the 
funding gap means that the lowest income quintile becomes 13.2% more energy 
efficient, which is the same as the central case and also scenario 2.C. However, this 
is the only similarity in the outcomes of scenarios 2.B and 2.C. The use of endogenous 
tax in 2.C leads to cumulative GDP gains of around £6.6billion by 2040, approximately 
£1billion more than the central case, and almost 1,300 more new full-time jobs.  
 28 
 
Table 3: Summary table of Scenarios Set 2 (Extreme scenarios) assumptions against central case (No-
Brexit) 
     
 
Central case (No-
Brexit) 
Scenario 2.A Scenario 2.B Scenario 2.C 
Government grants 
available (Until Year 
10) 
£78m/year in 
government grants 
No government 
grants 
No government 
grants £78m/year in 
government grants 
raised through 
income tax increase 
Government grants 
available (Year 11 
until Year 20) 
£78m/year in 
government grants 
£78m/year in 
government grants 
£78m/year in 
government grants 
ECO contributions 
available (Year 1 until 
Year 20) 
£13.99/year in ECO 
contributions 
£13.99/year in ECO 
contributions 
£13.99/year in ECO 
contributions 
£13.99/year in ECO 
contributions 
Interest-free loans 
available (Until Year 
10) 
£18.22/year in 
interest-free loans 
£18.22/year in 
interest-free loans 
£96.22/year in 
interest-free loans 
£18.22/year in 
interest-free loans 
Interest-free loans 
available (Year 11 
until Year 20) 
£18.22/year in 
interest-free loans 
Assumption on 
income tax 
Exogenous Exogenous Exogenous Endogenous 
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The results in Figure 3 share some similarities to the ones presented in Figure 1 for 
Scenarios Set 1. In both cases, matching the originally proposed funding level leads to 
similar long-term residential energy use savings to the central case. There are more 
significant differences between the central case and 2.A than between the central case 
and 1.A. This is because under 2.A there are no government grants available for a 10-
year period (until 2030), significantly reducing the number of retrofitted households and 
therefore the final efficiency improvement of the entire quintile of the lowest income 
households. 
A rather interesting finding is the considerable difference in residential energy use 
savings between the central case and scenario 2.B in year 10. Bridging the funding gap 
through the use of more government-backed interest-free loans means that the lowest 
income quintile is becoming more energy efficient at the same pace both in the central 
case and in 2.B. Yet, in year 10 there are significantly larger residential energy savings 
in scenario 2.B compared to the central case. The trigger for this outcome is the 
disposable income impacts associated with the use of interest-free loans as the way to 
bridge the funding gap in 2.B. The disposable income impacts for Set 2 are presented in 
Figure 4 below.  
Indeed, in year 10 (2030) under scenario 2.B, we observe a significant drop of 0.77% in 
the disposable income of the lowest income households. The fact that the funding gap is 
assumed to be entirely covered via the provision through government-backed interest-
free loans means that households have to pay higher annual loan repayments. As the 
repayments, like other commitments such as income tax, are assumed to precede any 
other consumption expenditures, the amount available for households to spend on their 
wider basket of spending is negatively affected. This affects spending on both energy 
and non-energy goods and services and is the reason we observe greater residential 
energy use savings at the same time. The reduced disposable income forces households 
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Figure 3: Potential EES-driven changes in residential energy 
use of the lowest income households for different extreme 
scenarios regarding availability of government grants 
(Scenarios Set 2)
No-Brexit 2.A 2.B 2.C
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to reduce their overall consumption, including reduced spending on residential energy by 
3.38%. Moreover, the erosion of new full-time jobs that we observe in scenario 2.B further 
suppresses the lowest income quintile’s disposable income but the effect of reduced 
employment is smaller than the effect of greater loan repayments. 
Ultimately, however, the benefits from realising energy efficiency improvements 
completely offset any earlier negative impacts in all the scenarios in Set 2. By the end of 
the ‘enabling’ stage in 2040 (year 20) we see that the disposable income of the lowest 
income quintile is larger compared to the pre-EES level under every scenario. But the 
eventual net gain is small under scenario 2.A. If the initial funding gap is not bridged then 
the lowest income households achieve only a 0.04% increase in their disposable income 
by the end of EES instead of the 0.52% that is possible in the central case, or even 
scenario 2.B (also a 0.52% increase in disposable income). Despite the disposable 
income gains in the years to follow, there is always a lag between the gains under 2.A 
and the central case, similarly to that observed for residential energy use savings. It is 
thus fair to question whether, in the event that any funding gap is not bridged, the social 
goal of EES to alleviate fuel poverty would be achieved, and if so to what extent. 
 
 
Interestingly, when income tax is used to cover the funding gap no negative impacts are 
observed at any point. Using income tax essentially socialises the cost of energy 
efficiency improvements for the lowest income households, placing a smaller burden on 
those households and a higher one on the more affluent ones. In fact, the disposable 
income changes observed under scenario 2.C are comparable to the ones initially 
observed in the central ‘No-Brexit’ case. Moreover, by employing an endogenous income 
tax process it is possible to achieve better income outcomes for the lowest income 
households (as in scenario 1.C), albeit at the expense of reduced residential and total 
economy-wide energy use savings. 
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Figure 4: Potential EES-driven changes in the disposable 
income of the lowest income households for different extreme 
scenarios regarding availability of government grants 
(Scenarios Set 2)
No-Brexit 2.A 2.B 2.C
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5. The potential impacts from reduced availability of private 
loans (Scenarios Set 3) 
The breakdown of the EES funding sources in Table 1 demonstrates that private loans 
play a key role in implementing EES and achieving the goals set by the Scottish 
Government. It may be expected that, due to the large amount of funds involved 
compared to the other funding instruments, any impact on the availability and/or the costs 
of private loans will have a significant effect on the magnitude of impacts we could 
anticipate from EES to the Scottish economy. As with government-backed loans, for 
simplicity, we have assumed that private loans are also interest-free. Thus, in this set of 
scenarios we only focus on changes in their availability rather than the cost in terms of 
changing interest. We examine the following two scenarios based on the reduction in 
capital availability reported in the Chatham House report: 
A. There is a permanent 10% reduction in the amount available for private interest-
free loans. This means that a reduced number of households from groups 2-5 can 
borrow money to retrofit their properties and as a result there is suppressed 
construction activity and reduced energy efficiency gains. 
B. The 10% reduction in private loans availability is temporary and lasts 5 year 
following Brexit (until 2025). Following that it recovers at a pace of 1% per year until 
it reaches the originally planned levels by year 15 (2035). 
We summarise Scenarios Set 3 in Table 4 and compare them against the central case 
assumptions. Note that in this Scenarios Set we only focus on the funding available to 
income quintiles 2-5. The funding available to the lowest income quintile (which only 
source loans from the government) is assumed to be unaffected. Therefore, the funding 
breakdown for the lowest income quintile which is presented in Table 1 applies here as 
well. 
Despite the fact that privately issued loans directly contribute only on the climate/energy 
goals of EES, still maintaining access to the originally planned amounts is key for the 
overall success of EES. Private loans are planned to contribute almost 61% of the total 
funding available for EES projects. Losing then a significant part of these funds will 
severely undermine the ability of EES to deliver its goals. The main issue/difference 
though between private loans and the funding mechanisms available to the lowest 
income households is that the Scottish Government has no direct control on the capital 
availability to support energy efficiency projects. As such, there is no direct way in which 
the Scottish Government can secure the continuous provision of privately-issued loans 
at the quantity and cost that has been originally planned. The only intervention that can 
be made from the government side is to try and maintain confidence among investors 
that funding energy efficiency projects in Scotland is a viable, profitable and secure 
investment. 
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Table 4: Summary table of Scenarios Set 3 assumptions against central case (No-
Brexit) 
    
 
Central case (No-
Brexit) Scenario 3.A Scenario 3.B 
ECO contributions 
available (Year 1 until 
Year 20) 
£46.01/year in ECO 
contributions 
£46.01/year in ECO 
contributions 
£46.01/year in ECO 
contributions 
Interest-free loans 
available (Until Year 5) 
£243.78/year in 
interest-free loans 
£219.4/year in 
interest-free loans 
£219.4/year in 
interest-free loans 
Interest-free loans 
available (Year 6 until 
Year 15) 
Gradual 1% 
recovery of amount 
available for private 
interest-free loans 
until the originally 
planned amount 
reached 
Interest-free loans 
available (Year 15 until 
Year 20) 
£243.78/year in 
interest-free loans 
 
Impact of reduced private loans 
In our central case analysis we find that, in the absence of any Brexit effects, EES can 
deliver cumulative GDP gains of £5.6billion by 2040, which increase to £7.5billion by 
2050, i.e. 10 years after the end of the ‘enabling’ stage. When the availability of private 
loans is restricted, the 2040 cumulative GDP gains are eroded to £5.3billion in scenario 
3.A and £5.5billion in 3.B. The erosion gains pace by 2050, when, instead of the 
£7.5billion cumulative GDP gains, scenario 3.A shows gains of £7.1billion and scenario 
3.B £7.3billion. 
Alongside the erosion of cumulative GDP gains, there is an erosion of full-time job 
creation. By 2040, there are 300 less full-time jobs created in 3.A and 200 less in 3.B, 
compared to the 6,300 created in the central case. In both cases, the percentage erosion 
in cumulative GDP gains is almost identical to the percentage erosion in additional 
employment. This finding indicates that there is an erosion on the number of new jobs 
across all sectors, with the average ‘quality’ not impacted. Similarly to the cumulative 
GDP, as we move beyond the end of the ‘enabling’ stage and into the ‘realising’ stage, 
when the impacts are dominated by the energy efficiency gains achieved, the gap in 
employment between the central case and 3.A and 3.B widens. However, the difference 
is in the tens rather than hundreds of new full-time jobs. 
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Table 5: Summary of changes in key EES macroeconomic variables due to Scenario Set 3 
            
 
Short-run (2020)   Year 20 (2040)   Year 30 (2050) 
 
No-
Brexit 
3.A 3.B   
No-
Brexit 
3.A 3.B   
No-
Brexit 
3.A 3.B 
GDP (in % change) 0.10 0.09 0.09  0.23 0.22 0.22  0.20 0.18 0.19 
Cumulative GDP (in £m) 115 108 108  5,604 5,338 5,511  7,497 7,135 7,337 
Employment (in % 
change) 
0.17 0.16 0.16  0.29 0.27 0.28  0.23 0.21 0.22 
Number of FTE jobs 3,718 3,504 3,507  6,302 6,004 6,176  4,987 4,673 4,838 
Total energy use (in % 
change) 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -1.19 -1.11 -1.16  -1.07 -1.00 -1.03 
Disposable income 
(excluding savings, in % 
change) 
0.10 0.09 0.09  0.15 0.15 0.15  0.12 0.11 0.11 
Lowest income quintile 
real income (in % 
change) 
0.05 0.05 0.05  0.52 0.52 0.52  0.73 0.73 0.73 
Residential energy 
consumption (in % 
change) 
-0.25 -0.25 -0.25  -3.39 -3.17 -3.30  -2.93 -2.74 -2.84 
Residential energy 
consumption of lowest 
income quintile (in % 
change) 
-0.35 -0.35 -0.35  -4.38 -4.38 -4.38  -4.02 -4.02 -4.02 
 
Especially after 2040, the observed gaps in cumulative GDP gains and full-time 
employment are associated with the differences in energy efficiency gains achieved. In 
the central case, each of the income quintiles 2 to 5 becomes 8.67% more energy 
efficient by 2040. In 3.A, where the reduction in private loan availability is permanent, the 
energy efficiency gains of each household are eroded to 7.95%, while if the reduction in 
loan availability is temporary, like in 3.B, then the efficiency gains are eroded to 8.33%. 
Apart from the GDP and employment impacts that this erosion of efficiency gains has, it 
also affects the energy savings across the Scottish economy. Indeed, while in the central 
case we see total energy savings of 1.07% by 2050, in 3.A they are eroded to 1% and in 
3.B to 1.03%. This shows that a permanent 10% reduction in private loans could lead to 
6% less total energy savings, while a temporary reduction to 3% less total energy 
savings, highlighting the importance of maintaining the loan availability as closely as 
possible to the original levels if EES is to achieve its climate/energy goals. 
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6. Final remarks and future research focus 
In this working paper we have presented some key insights from our work focusing on 
how the potential outcomes of the EES programme could be affected by Brexit. 
Specifically, we have focused on potential ways in which Brexit could affect some of the 
main funding mechanisms available for households to retrofit their properties: 
government grants and privately-provided interest-free loans. In light of continued Brexit 
uncertainties, we have used existing published material as a guide to develop a number 
of scenarios to analyse how funding limitations, and the options to overcome those 
limitations, could lead to different potential EES outcomes. We then compared the results 
of the different scenarios against our central ‘No-Brexit’ case.  
Our findings show that changes in the socio-economic landscape after Brexit can be 
expected to generate different outcomes compared to the central case. The differences 
may be observed in the long-term results reflecting a sustained outcome or could be 
temporary. It is important to use a case by case approach in order to identify the nature, 
permanent or temporary, of certain differences as well as their magnitude. However, 
there are some key lessons to be learned from the work we have conducted. 
 It is important to keep the overall funding as close as possible to the 
originally proposed levels. EES, like all energy efficiency improvement 
programmes, consists of two intertwined conceptual stages, the long lasting 
effects are delivered via the ‘realising’ stage. The magnitude of the benefits 
delivered by the ‘realising’ stage greatly depends on the number of households 
that manage to realise an energy efficiency improvement and this depends on 
the funding available. If the overall amount is kept close to the originally-
planned levels, the long-term effects will also be close to what was originally 
estimated, despite any temporary adverse effects that may be observed. 
 The option(s) used to maintain the level of funding are crucial. As was 
demonstrated by our simulations, interest-free loans are a useful tool to 
support EES projects but they should be used with caution. Relying exclusively 
on interest-free loans to cover the lack of government grants could negatively 
affect the disposable income of the lowest income households. These negative 
income effects could last up to 15 years before the gains from the efficiency 
improvements are sufficiently high to offset the negative effects. On the other 
hand, using an endogenous income tax approach to raise the necessary funds 
for government grants spreads the cost across all households, minimising the 
impact on the lowest income households. Following this approach the 
efficiency gains are sufficient from the outset of EES to cover any negative 
income effects from the increased taxation.    
 Private loans are crucial for the overall success of EES. The Scottish 
Government has indicated that there is a key role to be played by private 
institutions to facilitate energy efficiency improvements in the more affluent 
households. However, both the availability and the cost of those loans will need 
to remain close to the originally-estimated levels. If either the availability 
reduces or the cost increases, less households will opt to get a loan and 
therefore we will observe smaller gains from EES compared to what would be 
possible otherwise. However, more expensive loans will also place larger 
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restrictions on the disposable income of the households that do get a loan, 
further eroding the benefits from EES. It is key, then, that the government uses 
any tools in its disposal to try and ensure that this will be the case. 
However, the scenarios explored here are not the only ways in which EES might be 
affected by Brexit. A couple of other factors in which Brexit could affect the outcomes of 
EES would include the following: 
 Increased prices for imported intermediate goods. A large number of 
Scottish sectors rely on imports to enable their production (as intermediate 
inputs). Any increased cost(s) associated with importing intermediate goods 
(e.g. insulating material, more efficient heating equipment, more efficient light 
bulbs) would affect the EES outcomes in multiple ways. First, where the supply 
chains for energy efficiency delivery face higher costs, this could increase the 
cost of energy efficiency improvements faced by households, meaning that 
fewer households would receive efficiency improvements with the existing 
funds (a key factor affecting the benefits from the ‘realising’ stage of EES). 
Second, increased cost of imported intermediate goods would more generally 
increase the production cost, and therefore the price, of Scottish goods and 
services. This would not only limit the demand-driven expansion of the UK 
economy but would also harm the competitiveness of Scottish exports.  
 Limitations in the availability of skilled labour. In this working paper we 
have assumed that the sectors involved in the delivery of EES (in the ‘enabling’ 
stage) can handle the task. However, due to Brexit it will be increasingly 
difficult and costly to source skilled labour from the EU. Therefore, it may not 
be possible to deliver the desired volume of retrofitting projects within the 20-
year period of EES, due to lack on the necessary labour force. Or delivery may 
come at an increased cost leading to the issues described above. 
 
A potential focus for future work could be how each of the other two factors described 
here could further affect the potential outcomes of EES. Another is that the analysis 
would benefit from the introduction of bottom-up data to better inform the economy-
wide model of households’ energy consumption and provide additional details on how 
each fuel is used to provide different services. This is a recommendation from the 
International Energy Agency in their ‘Capturing the Multiple Benefits of Energy 
Efficiency’ (IEA, 2014) publication on how economy-wide analysis could be improved 
and one that we are seeking to address in future research projects. 
 
Data Statement 
This study uses data that are publically available from the University of Strathclyde at 
the following website: https://doi.org/10.15129/38c90098-3e67-4c93-9b74-
a77d6fdc54d9. No new data were created during this study.   
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Appendix A: The model and data used 
A.1 The CGE model 
Our model is based on the AMOS ENVI CGE model used by Figus et al. (2018) to explore 
the usefulness of energy efficiency as a regional policy tool. Because the model focuses 
on a regional economy, we assume a flexible labour supply which is positively related to 
the differences between the log of the regional and the national real wages, while being 
negatively related to the difference between the log of the regional and national 
unemployment rate. However, rather than using a wage curve to determine the real 
wage, we assume that the nominal wage is fixed. As described by Figus et al. (2018) we 
represent production using a nested constant elasticity of substitution structure (CES), 
where labour and capital are nested together while energy and non-energy intermediates 
are nested together. Domestically-produced and imported goods and services are 
assumed to be imperfect substitutes using an Armington assumption (Armington, 1969). 
 
A key difference is that instead of a single representative household, in our model we 
have five household income quintiles. This allows us to simulate scenarios where 
different income groups have access to different funding mechanisms, which is the case 
with EES. For each of the household groups we model their behaviour to maximise their 
discounted intertemporal activity subject to a wealth constraint. Solving this optimisation 
path then gives us the optimal consumption path for each household group, consisting 
of energy and non-energy goods, domestic and imported, which are also considered 
imperfect substitutes (Armington, 1969). 
Modelling ECO 
A key point of focus is how the different funding mechanisms are modelled in our CGE 
model. Starting off with ECO there are two main elements that need to be considered. 
The first involves the funds provided by energy companies to energy efficiency 
improvement projects and the other is associated with the way in which energy 
companies recover the funds. For the allocation of funding we assume that the Scottish 
‘Construction’ sector will be the one delivering the retrofitting. Therefore, we model the 
ECO funds as an increase in the final demand for the outputs of Scottish ‘Construction’ 
sector. The cost of ECO on the other hand is passed on to the entire residential consumer 
base of energy companies, not just those receiving the efficiency improvement. To reflect 
then the necessary increase in energy bills to cover the cost of ECO, we have re-specified 
the energy price paid by households as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒 = 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑐 × (1 + 𝜃)   [1] 
Penemc is the price of energy in a perfectly competitive market, while θ is a mark-up and 
Pene the price of energy paid by households. The difference between the price paid by 
households and the competitive market price is the marginal profit of the energy 
companies. 
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𝑚𝑝 = 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒 − 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑐   [2] 
If the marginal profit is then multiplied to the total revenue of the energy companies, the 
product needs to be equal to ECO. 
 
𝐸𝐶𝑂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑚𝑝(𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒 ∙ 𝑄𝑒𝑛𝑒)   [3] 
With ECO being exogenously determined and having functions for all the other 
endogenous variables, we can solve equations [1] to [3] for the mark-up required so that 
energy companies recover the cost of ECO through their residential customers. 
 
Modelling household interest-free loans 
Another funding mechanism to be used for EES is the provision of loans, either interest-
free or low-interest ones, backed either by the government or issued by private 
institutions. For ease of modelling, in our work we assume that the loans across the 
board, regardless of the provider, will be interest free. The key differentiating point is the 
amount available for each household group and therefore the repayment cost for each 
group. 
 
In terms of how the household loans are modelled, we follow a rather simple approach. 
The loans themselves are modelled as an increase of final demand for the output of the 
Scottish ‘Construction’ sector. As is the case with ECO, we assume that this increase of 
final demand is exogenous, fixed and lasts for the entire duration of EES. The 
repayments are assumed to last 10 years, starting from the year that retrofitting takes 
place. Therefore, a household that receives the retrofitting in year 5 will repay the loan 
by year 15 and as a result the repayment period exceeds the duration of EES itself. An 
important point to keep in mind is that loan repayments are assumed to be the top priority 
of households. This means that first they cover the cost of their instalments and then, 
with the remaining disposable income, cover the rest of their needs. The result coming 
from this assumption is that consumption is suppressed compared to what could have 
been in the absence of the loan repayments. 
Modelling government grants 
The final funding mechanism we consider is government grants. Grants are modelled as 
an increase of the government, as a type of final consumer, purchases from the Scottish 
‘Construction’ sector that is delivering the retrofitting projects.  
 
The increased government purchases though have an impact on the government budget 
balance. There are two ways in which we assume the necessary funds for grants are 
raised. The first is to allow for an increased budget deficit. In this case the government is 
allowed to spend more that its revenue, assuming that the funds are coming from a 
source exogenous to the Scottish economy, be it contributions from the UK Government, 
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EU funds or any other sources external to the Scottish Government. Moreover, when the 
funds for grants are raised through budget deficit we assume that the income tax is 
exogenous. 
 
The alternative way to model government grants is through the use of taxation to raise 
the necessary funds. In this case we assume the income tax to be endogenous and the 
Scottish Government is obliged to have a balanced budget. Therefore, as the 
government’s demand for the output of Scottish ‘Construction’ increases, the income tax 
rate increases as well to ensure that there is no budget deficit. A key point to highlight 
here is that once the retrofitting activity and the energy efficiency start delivering budget 
savings, the income tax rate is reduced returning the budget savings to the households. 
 
A.2 The data 
The baseline data that provide us with the structure of the economy come from the 2013 
Scottish Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)13 developed by the Fraser of Allander institute 
at the University of Strathclyde. The Scottish industrial sectors are aggregated into 29 
groups, with the energy sectors – coal, crude oil and gas extraction, oil refinement, 
electricity generation and distribution and gas distribution – being more disaggregated. 
Furthermore, the SAM includes a series of economic agents; the government, five 
household groups, corporate sectors, while it accounts for imports and exports to the rest 
of UK and the rest of the world. The underlying assumption is that prior to the energy 
efficiency improvements, and the associated retrofitting activity, the Scottish economy is 
in a steady-state equilibrium, therefore our model is calibrated to reflect this assumption.  
 
Regarding the EES-specific data, we assume that EES will be implemented by a 
mechanism similar to the one used for the nationally managed Warmer Homes Scotland 
(Warmhomes) scheme and therefore the funding breakdown follows similar patterns. 
There are three funding options we consider: government grants, ECO and loans 
(government-backed or private). The contributions in kind by the Scottish Gas Networks 
were not considered in our simulations. The total value of retrofitting projects, across all 
household groups, is assumed to be £400million per annum. For the government grants 
we assume an indicative amount of £78million per year, directed towards only the lowest 
income group HG1. From that amount we estimate the total value of projects for HG1 to 
be approximately £110million per annum, with the remaining £32million split between 
ECO contributions and government-backed loans which are assumed to be interest-free. 
 
The remaining approximately £290million per annum is the value of retrofitting projects 
in the remaining household groups and is broken down into ECO contributions and 
private loans, which are again considered to be interest-free. The overwhelming majority 
                                                     
13 The SAM used is publically available at this address: https://doi.org/10.15129/38c90098-3e67-4c93-9b74-
a77d6fdc54d9  
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of the funding is provided through loans in line with the government’s view of the 
important role that private institutions have to play in the implementation of EES and the 
somewhat limited value of the existing ECO contributions.  
 
The total amount to be spent across the duration of EES is £10billion, with our work 
focusing on the £8billion delivered through grants, ECO and loans. We estimate that over 
237,000 low income (HG1) households and over 718,000 households from the other 
groups would benefit initially. The average efficiency improvement per retrofitted property 
is 23.66% and is taken by data provided by the Energy Saving Trust. This efficiency 
improvement reflects the average energy cost savings achieved through Warmhomes, 
as estimated through the Energy Performance Certificate measurements taken from 
properties retrofitted via Warmhomes. The efficiency improvement figures are then 
scaled to reflect the efficiency improvement of the entire household group and through 
that we estimate that by the end of the programme HG1 will be 13.2% more energy 
efficient, while each of the other groups will be 8.67% more energy efficient, compared 
to the pre-EES circumstances. 
 
 
